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INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2016, we helped organize a symposium, titled 
“Government Participation in Resolution Processes,” that explored whether 
the recent trend of expanding governmental involvement in corporate 
restructurings creates marketplace or other distortions—and then 
considered possible solutions that might increase predictability and 
certainty when the government does intervene in chapter 11 proceedings.  
Beyond the considerable substantive contributions of the panels, the 
symposium was notable for another reason:  it was the inaugural event of 
the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Restructuring Studies, also 
referred to as the Penn Restructuring Institute. 
 As co-founders of the Institute, we are grateful to the Journal of 
Business Law for devoting part of this issue to publishing the extended 
presentations of several of the symposium’s panelists.  We also appreciate 
the Journal graciously providing us this space not only to preview those 
articles, but also to explain the Institute’s background and goals.  We hope 
and believe the mission of the Penn Restructuring Institute will further the 
educational objectives of the University of Pennsylvania generally, and the 
*  Partner, Restructuring Group, Kirkland & Ellis LLP.  The views expressed herein are 
solely my own and are not offered on behalf of my firm, any client, or other organization. 
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Journal of Business Law specifically, and thus it seems fitting to use these 
pages to formally introduce this project. 
I. THE INSTITUTE
First, our mission.  The Penn Restructuring Institute is a 
multidisciplinary initiative intended to address timely corporate and 
municipal insolvency issues and influence the public policy debate in a 
manner that has practical application for investors, practitioners, regulators, 
and academics—and to do so at a university that is both well known for 
producing restructuring industry leaders and located within the financial, 
legal, intellectual, and political nexus of New York and Washington, D.C. 
Let’s unpack that.  As we have taught and practiced restructuring law, 
and through our writing, speaking, and testifying on related issues, we have 
encountered a distinct disconnect among the various constituencies deeply 
involved and interested in bankruptcy-related reforms.  Put simply, there 
are many influential actors in this space, but there is little connective tissue 
between investors, practitioners, regulators, and the academic community.  
Other than the American Bankruptcy Institute, which has its own 
multifaceted approach to similar issues, there are few opportunities for the 
different constituencies involved in restructuring issues to engage one 
another directly. 
This void is the primary impetus for the Penn Restructuring Institute.  
There are many persons and entities separately pursuing important 
restructuring initiatives.  We hope to link these thought leaders, and to 
facilitate a vigorous, informative, and nonpartisan debate about the most 
consequential issues driving our profession. 
Thus far, the Institute has enlisted the leadership of approximately 
twenty-five of our colleagues, from varied private and public sectors of the 
restructuring industry, to comprise a blue-ribbon Advisory Board that will 
help guide our efforts.1  Beginning with this symposium, and continuing 
with a series of further collaborative events and work products, the 
Advisory Board will help, we hope, to generate a wide-ranging and 
productive dialogue. 
Why does this matter?  There are several key reasons, with the 
common theme that, even more than other areas of law, restructuring law 
and practice develop within and across multiple realms. 
While difficult to quantify precisely, the vast majority of corporate 
restructurings are accomplished through out-of-court workouts, as opposed 
 1. Like the authors, all members of the Advisory Board are participating in the 
Institute’s work in their individual capacities only, and not as representatives of their 
respective institutions. 
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to in-court chapter 11 cases.  (This is especially true to the extent the 
reorganization primarily involves financial deleveraging transactions, 
which are more prevalent than operational overhauls.)  To be sure, chapter 
11 plays a role even here.  A company’s ability to obtain sufficient creditor 
consensus to avoid the need for a formal bankruptcy proceeding is 
significantly affected by the parties’ understanding of the respective legal 
benefits and risks to their position(s) in a chapter 11 case.  But the reality is 
that a huge amount of restructuring “law”—i.e., the dynamics governing 
the art of the possible—advances outside of courtrooms and judicial 
decisions.
Moreover, even chapter 11 itself evolves largely beyond the formal 
legislative process.  While Congress does periodically amend the 
Bankruptcy Code, those changes are often reactive—and at the margins.  
During the long periods of relative legislative calm, bankruptcy practice 
norms undergo gradual, yet often dramatic, changes.  To cite one example, 
section 363 of the Code was enacted to allow a debtor “after notice and a 
hearing . . . [to] sell . . . other than in the ordinary course of business, 
property of the estate. . . .”2  This provision originally was understood to 
allow courts to authorize companies to sell discrete pieces of property (such 
as an individual building or perhaps even a specific business unit).  Over 
time, however, section 363 was expanded to permit the sale of effectively 
all of a debtor’s most valuable assets, frequently at the outset of a case 
(with the sale proceeds and less desirable property left behind in the 
chapter 11 estate for later distribution to creditors).  Whatever one thinks of 
this trend, the acceptance of so-called rapid section 363 sales for most or all 
of a company has undeniably influenced the tactical options and bargaining 
leverage among debtors and their secured and unsecured creditors.  While 
the text of the Bankruptcy Code itself may be largely static, its use and 
interpretation is very dynamic.3
Finally, in the context of corporate reorganizations, the application of 
law to facts is dissimilar from conventional commercial litigation.  In the 
latter, the key parties and the underlying evidence) often are largely fixed 
(though subject to development through discovery).  This means that if the 
relevant law is well established, it should be a reasonably straightforward 
 2. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2015). 
 3.  We acknowledge there are exceptions to our point about practice being the 
principal source of change.  In 2005, Congress amended section 365(d)(4) to require debtors 
to assume or reject all real property leases within 120 days (subject to a 90-day extension).  
This significantly curtailed the ability of retailers, with hundreds or perhaps thousands of 
leased store locations, to undertake and accomplish orderly reorganizations—and resulted in 
a spate of liquidations.  We do not claim that legislative changes are irrelevant—it is that 
they typically are infrequent, and piecemeal, but the evolution of chapter 11 practice under 
the Code marches forward in the interim. 
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exercise to determine a risk-adjusted litigation expected outcome.  In a 
restructuring, by contrast, certain facts may be settled, such as the textual 
provisions of credit agreements and indentures (though their meanings are 
often subject to debate).  Yet even if the applicable law is clear, the 
identities of the key parties may shift repeatedly, as certain investor-
creditors trade in and out of various positions within the company’s capital 
structure.  Further, their motivations and actions will be impacted by the 
market prices of the company’s debt and equity securities, which are 
variable and subject to multiple exogenous factors, economic and 
otherwise.  Navigating a restructuring is akin to playing a game of chess 
where the other side’s pieces (and those pieces’ abilities to make different 
moves) may change constantly—often based on factors out of the parties’ 
control. 
Although we have focused above on chapter 11 and its relationship to 
out-of-court restructuring practice, other forms of insolvency resolution 
proceedings—from bank failures to municipal bankruptcies—have many of 
the same characteristics.  They are highly interdisciplinary and 
continuously evolving. 
Which brings us back to the mission of the Penn Restructuring 
Institute.  If one believes, as we do, that bankruptcy and other forms of 
restructuring are critical tools for enhancing a functioning capitalist 
economy, seeking to improve predictability and certainty—both for 
companies and for their existing and potential stakeholders—is a 
worthwhile endeavor.  Events of the last few decades demonstrate that any 
of America’s largest and most iconic corporations—and indeed, entire 
crucial industries—may need to resort to chapter 11 or other formal or 
informal restructuring frameworks.  Given the dynamism and fluidity 
described above, and the ever-expanding domain of restructuring law and 
practice, there is an enormous need to bridge the informational gaps and 
promote interaction between the many communities at the forefront of 
these issues.  We believe the timing is ideal, and the need is distinct, for an 
initiative like the Penn Restructuring Institute. 
II. THE SYMPOSIUM
As we have already noted, the Institute’s inaugural symposium 
focused on government participation in resolution processes.  The first of 
the two panels considered the government’s role as a “prepetition actor,” 
that is, when the government provides start-up funds or other financing to 
systemically important firms that have not yet defaulted; the second 
emphasized government involvement as a “postpetition actor” after a 
default has occurred.  Speakers on the first panel included Professor Stuart 
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Gilson of Harvard Business School; Professor Robert Rasmussen, professor 
and immediate past dean of the University of Southern California Law 
School; Jonathan Silver, managing partner of Tax Equity Advisors and a 
former high level official on government financing in the Obama 
administration; and Doug Schoen, a pollster who worked in the Clinton 
administration.  The second panel featured Patrick Bolton, a professor at 
Columbia Business School; Charles Gray, Vice President of the Financial 
Institution Supervisory Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; 
Marc Heimowitz, a portfolio manager at Claren Road Asset Management; 
and Jim Millstein, founder of Millstein & Co. and former Chief 
Restructuring Officer in the Obama Administration. 
The question of whether and how the government should provide 
rescue—or bailout—financing to troubled financial institutions figured 
prominently on both panels.  Given the continued relevance of and 
controversy surrounding this issue, it seemed a fitting subject for more 
extensive analysis.  The two speakers who focused most directly on this 
issue—Marc Heimowitz and Robert Rasmussen—each agreed to develop 
their insights into formal articles for the purposes of the symposium.  We 
are pleased to say a few words about the articles that have emerged from 
the earlier insights, and that appear in these pages. 
In “Government as a Rescue Financer: Not Just a Private Lender,” 
Heimowitz begins by comparing the role of the government as financer in 
distressed situations to that of private lenders.  As suppliers of needed 
financing, both are in a position to control the troubled institutions and the 
distribution of value among claimants.  Yet, in sharp contrast to private 
lenders, the government pursues noncommercial objectives as well as 
commercial ones.  The presence of these two factors—control and 
noncommercial objectives—creates a great deal of uncertainty for creditors 
and other market participants.  Can this uncertainty be reduced?  
Heimowitz contends it can and outlines four principles to guide rescue 
financing by the government in the future.  The first is a very clever 
strategy for market testing government rescue financing.  In a true crisis, 
private lenders are not a realistic alternative to government financing, 
which makes it impossible to subject the government’s loan to a traditional 
market test.  In economic terms, “the slope of the supply curve for massive 
rescue financing is nearly vertical at needed quantities in the short-term.”4
As an alternative, Heimowitz proposes that a slice of the loan—in an 
amount that is “very large but possible”—be raised on the private markets, 
and that the interest rate and other features of the private financing be used 
 4.  Marc J. Heimowitz, Government as a Rescue Financer: Not Just a Private Lender,
19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 49 (forthcoming Fall 2016). 
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to price the government’s rescue loan.5  The government would no longer 
need to set the terms of the financing in a vacuum; it could harness the 
information provided by the market.  Heimowitz’s other three principles 
are similarly insightful.  We won’t summarize them here, lest we spoil the 
treat of reading the article itself. 
In drafting his article for the symposium, Rasmussen joined forces 
with one of us, more than twenty years after we last co-authored an article.6
Like Heimowitz, Rasmussen and Skeel contend that bailouts will always be 
with us, and thus that the crucial question is how best to manage them.  In 
“Government Intervention in an Economic Crisis,” Rasmussen and Skeel 
divide the bailout process into three general stages:  the decision to 
intervene, implementation of the bailout, and exit.7  A key theme in their 
analysis is political accountability.  At the intervention stage, this requires 
transparency and a clear articulation of reasons for intervening; with 
implementation, political accountability calls for respect for priorities and 
government involvement in the bailout recipient’s business only on issues 
(such as removing managers or directors) that can easily be traced.  
Rasmussen and Skeel further argue that the government should exit its 
investment as soon as the crisis has been contained.  Rasmussen and Skeel 
also address the question whether government intervention should be 
subject to judicial review.  They conclude that it should, but that the scope 
of review should be considerably narrower than it is for transactions 
between private parties, in order to minimize interference with emergency 
interventions.
Whether you agree with the conclusions reached in these articles—or 
with either one, since the conclusions differ in important respects—we 
hope they provide new insights into the government’s handling of rescue 
financing. 
 5.  Id. Heimowitz’s proposal bears an interesting resemblance to a strategy Mark Roe 
advocated many years ago for determining the capital structure of a debtor in an ordinary 
chapter 11 case. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate 
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (1983) (suggesting that “the reorganization 
value of the public firm could be found by selling a slice, say 10%, of new common stock 
into the market, and extrapolating enterprise value from the sale price”). 
 6.  Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (1995). 
 7.  Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., Government Intervention in an 
Economic Crisis, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 7 (forthcoming Fall 2016). 
